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Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination
Processes in Cases of Domestic Violence

Donna Coker

Stopping domestic violence is hard work. Domestic violence is a social
practice maintained by multiple systems that operate in the lives of battering men and battered women. For men in subordinated communities, social inequalities related to race, poverty, and Indigenous status,
for example, operate in complex ways that are related to a man's choice
to use violence, though none is its single definitive 'cause'. The same
intersecting oppressive systems operate in women's lives. For example,
poverty increases women's vulnerability to battering and limits their
ability to escape violence; violence increases women's vulnerability to
poverty.
This chapter attempts to further the dialogue between restorative justice activists and scholars and feminist anti-domestic violence activists
and scholars. My focus is on the struggle against domestic violence in
subordinated communities. My aim is to address the need for justice
strategies that account for the intersecting oppressive systems that operate in the lives of battering men and battered women who are members
of these communities.
My discussion draws on theory and practice of both the feminist
movement against domestic violence and the restorative justice movement. Feminist theory provides critical insights regarding the dangers of
reliance on private mechanisms of control, the causes of male violence
against women, the necessity of engaging the state on.behalf of women,
and the conflicting and ambiguous nature of that state intervention.
Restorative justice theory offers critical insights regarding the way
offenders' experiences with the criminal justice system influence their
likelihood of reoffending, the importance of providing victims the
opportunity to be active agents in developing responses to crime, and
the importance of social networks of family and friends both in providing restraints against crime and in caring for victims of crime. I hope to
lay the groundwork for a dialogue between feminist theorists working
against domestic violence and restorative justice theorists. Building on
the insights of both fields will enrich anti-domestic violence theory and
practice.
128
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I begin with a critique of the feminist analysis of liberalism's public/private distinction as it relates to anti-domestic violence work.
Feminist efforts to construct domestic violence as a public issue rather
than a private problem have been critical for gaining women's access to
public resources, including criminal justice resources. But the discourse
that constructs domestic violence as a public issue is subject to cooptation in ways that increase state control of poor women and women
of colour. The critical dilemma for feminists who seek to empower battered women is to develop strategies for controlling the criminal justice
system without increasing state control of women.
Restorative justice processes, on the other hand, threaten to reprivatize domestic violence in ways that are harmful to women. Feminist
critics have warned of the dangers of restorative justice processes that
privilege family and community forms of intervention, noting that family and community are often unwilling or unable to oppose domestic
violence (Goel, 2000; Hooper & Busch, 1996; Stubbs, 1995; Stubbs,
this volume). Indeed, family and community are often the primary supports for male control of women. I share these concerns of feminist critics, but I focus on a second manner in which restorative justice
processes may be said to be 'privatizing'. The restorative justice critique
of punitive criminal justice responses emphasizes the power of the state
to do harm (Braithwaite, 1989), yet restorative justice proponents often
construct the state as a distant and largely irrelevant party (Hudson &
Gal away, 1996). This construction of the state elides state power and
naturalizes state created crime categories and the operation of state
crime control systems. Thus, restorative justice processes threaten to
create a deeply privatized criminal justice process.
I identify two additional serious theoretical weaknesses of restorative
justice theory as applied to domestic violence cases. First, it offers no
clear principles for dealing with crimes, such as domestic violence,
where majoritarian opposition to the crime is weak or compromised.
Second, restorative justice theory under-theorizes criminal offending,
generally, providing little foundation for a theory of male violence
against women.
These weaknesses can be addressed by current feminist theory, critical race feminist theory, social science research regarding domestic violence, and the theoretical underpinnings of programs for men who
batter. Incorporating insights from these theoretical and empirical
sources can enable restorative justice theory to effectively address the
complicated problem of domestic violence.
Finally, I call for anti-subordination processes that address the intersecting oppressive systems that operate in the lives of men and women
in subordinated communities. These anti-subordination processes

130

Donna Coker

should seek to transform private relationships - the social networks that
reinforce and support a batterer's controlling behaviour as well as the
social networks that can assist battered women. A process that attempts
to animate family and community to intervene against domestic violence need not result in re-privatizing domestic violence, provided the
process seeks to transform the norms of family and community members, rather than rely on existing anti-battering norms that may be weak
or contradictory. A focus on race and class subordination need not
excuse domestic violence, provided that battering men are encouraged
to connect their own experiences of subordination with their subordination of women.
In developing these processes I draw on Ruth Morris's concept of
transformative justice (Morris, 1994, 1995). I expand Morris's model to
include concepts from innovative programs, including batterers' treatment programs, that link a critical analysis of the racist, sexist, and
classist practices of the criminal justice system with offender accountability to victims and communities. A process that incorporates insights
from feminist and critical race feminist theory as well as restorative justice theory offers battered women and battering men the possibility of
transforming communities as well as interpersonal relationships.

The Dilemma of Privacy: Battering as a Public Issue

The controversy about nation-wide implementation of mandatory arrest policies reflects the ambivalence with which feminists regard the police. On one
hand, battered women's advocates want to hold the police accountable, as
agents of the state, for carrying out the government's mandate to protect citizens. On the other hand, feminists realize that police often exercise their power
in ways that reinforce the disadvantages already experienced by women, and in
ways that reinforce the disadvantages experienced by members of poor and
minority communities as well. (Sparks, 1997: 35-36)

Feminist challenges to the liberal distinction between the public realm
of the state and market and the private realm of family and community
have long been central to anti-domestic violence activism (Goldfarb,
2000; Schneider, 1991). In contrast to concepts ofthe family as a haven
that fosters personal development and civic engagement, feminists have
documented the extent to which families are sites of domestic tyranny
marked by violence and coercion (Bartlett, 1999; Kelly, 1996).
Feminists have further exposed the manner in which public/private
ideology hides state action by making patriarchal families appear natural and inevitable (Fineman, 1995). Both positive law and the absence
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of law create family structures of dominance (Fenton, 1999; Miccio,
2000; Minow, 1990; Taub & Schneider, 1990). Constructing domestic
violence as a public issue exposes the state's collusion with batterers,
underscores the seriousness of the violence, and emphasizes battering as
a civil rights issue.
By contrast, restorative justice scholarship presumes a largely unproblematized distinction between public and private life. Dominant methods of criminal processing are said to 'steal' the conflict from the parties
(Braithwaite, 1999). As compared to state actors, community and family members are presumed to have a greater stake in responding to crime
and to be better able to meet the needs of victims.
A number of feminist scholars have raised concerns about the privatizing potential of restorative justice processes (Busch, this volume;
Hooper & Busch, 1996; Stubbs, 1995; Stubbs, this volume). When
applied to domestic violence cases, reliance on mechanisms of the private realms of family and community threatens to reverse progress by
pushing domestic violence back into the realm of the 'private' (Hooper
& Busch, 1996; Stubbs, this volume).
Feminist critics also worry that processes like conferencing will
'domesticate' the violence (Cobb, 1997), couching it as mere conflict or
as centred in unique relationship dynamics rather than as the result of
the batterer's struggle to dominate his partner (Hooper & Busch, 1996;
Stubbs, this volume). In addition, some feminist scholars are concerned
that the moral educative function of criminalization may be lost when
restorative justice processes replace retributive processes (see Daly, this
volume). Public punishment marks the violence as serious and 'send[s]
a clear social message that battering is impermissible' (Schneider, 1991:
989).1

The dilemma of privacy: limits of the public/private analysis
These critiques of the public/private distinction have been important to
organizing public opposition against domestic violence, but feminists
have paid too little attention to the dangers of a focus on making domestic violence a public problem. The feminist critique ofthe public/private
distinction is an important but incomplete analysis of the relationship
between battered women and the state. It is inaccurate to describe the
state's response to domestic violence as a unified refusal to intervene in
'private' family matters. Race and class mark the history of the state's
relationship to families in general, and to domestic violence, in particular (Gordon, 1988; Roberts, 1999; Siegel, 1996). As Riva Siegel's history of US law demonstrates, notions of family privacy eventually gave
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way to class and race based notions of white middle-class superiority
(Siegel, 1996). By the end of the nineteenth century harsh penalties
such as whipping were proposed for wife beaters who were characterized as 'lawless or unruly men of the "dangerous classes'" (Siegel, 1996:
2139). These 'dangerous classes' referred primarily to African-American
and low-status immigrant men (Siegel, 1996). Linda Gordon's history
of a child-saving organization in Boston similarly demonstrates that
there was little objection to state intervention when family violence was
understood as a problem of poor immigrant families (Gordon, 1988).
The racist and classist beliefs of state actors may support intervention
as well as non-intervention, but neither choice derives from beliefs
about protecting family privacy. For example, the practice of police to
refuse to intervene when violence is 'horizontal' - e.g., involving two
persons of similar (and devalued) race and/or class (Ferraro, 1989;
Hampton, 1987) better explains police refusal to assist battered women
of colour than does their desire to guard family privacy (Ferraro, 1989).
Further problematizing an emphasis on domestic violence as a public
problem is the fact that the lives of poor women and women of colour
are often under-privatized (Fineman, 1995; Roberts, 1995; Roberts,
1999). In other words, women need privacy (Roberts, 1999; Schneider,
1991). US women who receive government assistance have little protection from state intrusion (Roberts, 1995). Families headed by single
mothers are deemed suspect and 'may be thought of as "public" families, not entitled to privacy' (Fineman, 1995: 178). Suspicion about the
mothering abilities of poor women and particularly of poor AfricanAmerican women results in disproportionate numbers of their children
in the US foster care system (Roberts, 1995).2 The massive removal of
Indigenous children by the governments of Australia, the US, and
Canada eloquently demonstrates the way in which an ideal of family
privacy has little relevance for the description of relations between the
state and families in subordinated communities (Australia Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997; Kline, 1992; Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978).
In addition to state control of women as mothers, US women of
colour and particularly African-American women who live in urban
cores are subjected to significant invasions of privacy incidental to the
'war on drugs', renamed by some the 'war on poor people' (BushBaskette, 1998). This war is largely responsible for increases in the
numbers of women in prison (Chesney-Lind, 1998) and the extraordinary increases in the numbers of imprisoned African-American women
(Bush-Baskette, 1998).
The ways in which the state operates to control and disempower poor
women and women of colour illustrates the value of restorative justice
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concerns with the state 'stealing conflict' from the community. Given a
choice between the privatizing problems of community control versus
the oppressive intervention of the state, some women will choose the
former.

'Tough on crime' and domestic violence

Women's lives are subject to 'interlocking' (Fellows & Razack, 1998)
and 'intersecting' (Crenshaw, 1991) sites for potential subordination.
This reality shapes the effects and meaning of domestic violence intervention strategies. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that feminist
discourse that regards domestic violence as a public issue is subject to
cooptation. The language of public issue has been adopted by those
whose agenda, unlike that of feminists, is not focussed on empowering
women. If the 'problem belongs to the public, then individual women's
desires need not be central to policy development (Mills, 1999).
Further, given the trend in many countries, and especially the US, to
enact increasingly harsh control and surveillance methods for dealing
with social problems (Browne, 1995; Caplow & Simon, 1999; Fellows
& Razack, 1998), domestic violence as a public problem has largely
come to mean domestic violence as a crime control problem (Currie,
1993). Zero tolerance arrest policies and no-drop prosecution are popular in no small part because they resonate with this emphasis on punishment and control (Coker, 2001; Martin, 1998; Snider, 1998).
The dilemma for using the criminal justice system to empower
battered women is to develop strategies for controlling state actors ensuring that the police come when called and that prosecutors do not
trivialize cases - without increasing state control of women. It is the
dilemma of making domestic violence a public responsibility in the context of racist and classist public systems.
Aggressive crime enforcement policies that mandate arrest and
require prosecutors to pursue domestic violence cases, ~ven when victims are opposed to arrest and prosecution, are central to much of feminist law reform in the US, England, Canada, and Australia (Dobash &
Dobash, 1999a). A primary reason for feminist support of these policies
is that they increase the likelihood that police and prosecutors will act
to protect women rather than trivialize or ignore their complaints
(Stark, 1996).3 For years, the problem with police intervention for US
battered women of colour and Indigenous women was a problem of
police refusal to intervene. Loretta Kelly (this volume) documents similar problems with police refusal to assist Aboriginal women in
Australia. Thus, work to ensure that police respond when they are called
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and that they protect women when they arrive is central to justice for
battered women. But mandatory policies such as no-drop prosecution
and zero tolerance policing increase the potential for state interference
and control in women's lives. This is particularly true for poor women
and women of colour (Espenoza, 1999; Mills, 1999). As a direct result
of these arrest policies, for example, more women are arrested for
domestic violence (Hamberger & Potente, 1994; Zorza & Woods, 1994).
Strong anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the women arrested are
victims of battering who are acting in self-defence or who are responding to a pattern of abuse (Zorza, 1994; Hamberger & Potente, 1994). In
addition to arrests for domestic violence, aggressive criminal interventions also threaten increased state control for those battered women
involved in (other) criminal activity. Women's involvement in illegal
drug activity and prostitution is often directly related to being in an abusive relationship (Daly, 1994; Richie, 1996). As noted earlier, the danger of identification, arrest, and conviction is much higher for women of
colour and particularly African-American women who live in heavily
policed 'drug zones'. In addition, domestic violence arrest mandates
may aggravate racist and abusive police behaviours (Kelly, 1999; Rivera,
1994; Snider, 1998).
Zero tolerance arrest policies also create collateral harms for women.
If a battered woman is arrested for domestic violence she may lose the
protection afforded by special domestic violence legislation. For example, evidence of her arrest, even if she is not charged, may prevent her
from benefiting from child custody laws that disfavour a violent parent
(see, e.g., Florida Statute 61.30,2000). In addition, police intervention
and sustained prosecutorial presence increase state control of women
through child protection monitoring (Pennell & Burford, this volume).
In the US, many child protection agencies treat a child's residence in a
home where domestic violence takes place as child abuse, even when the
child was not present at the time the abuse took place (Nicholson v.
Williams; Sengp.pta, 2000). Children are removed from the home and
the mother's parenting is more broadly investigated (S. Dougan, attorney, personal communication, 1999). If both parents are arrested, children may be placed in temporary foster care.
In addition to these direct and collateral harms, the practice of denying women any voice in the criminal processing of intimates (or former
intimates) raises questions regarding the legitimate role of battered
women's agency (Mills, 1999; Minow, 2000).4 These policies limit
women's ability to negotiate the terrain between state control and private control (Ford, 1991; Harrell & Smith, 1996; Kendrick, 1998).
Women, and in the US especially low-income African-American
women, rely on the police to interrupt and prevent battering episodes
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(Buzawa et aI, 1999; Hutchinson & Hirschel, 1998). This does not necessarily mean that they seek prosecution and punishment. Some women
clearly do, but others use the threat of prosecution to gain key concessions from the batterer. This kind of bargaining becomes impossible in
jurisdictions with no-drop prosecution policies (Ford, 1991; Wittner,
1998) .
In addition, mandatory criminal interventions reinforce pathological
notions of battered women who do not want to assist prosecution and
who do not want to separate from a partner who abuses them. As
Martha Mahoney explains, women's 'failure' to separate is often understood as evidence that a battered woman is crazy, lying about the severity of the abuse, or both (Mahoney, 1991). 'Staying' is a socially suspect
choice - often perceived as acceptance of violence ... ' (Mahoney, 1994:
60). As Julia Perilla notes, 'a failure to leave the relationship is seen by
many ... court systems as a woman's failure to do something for herself
and her family' (Perilla, 1999: 124).
Thus, legal professionals in reform institutions in the US - judges
who routinely hear protection order or misdemeanour battering cases,
court personnel hired to work with battered women, prosecutors, police
officers, probation officers, and court clerks - presume that women
should separate for their safety (Coker, 2000; Fenton, 1999; Wittner,
1998). In fact, some actors refuse to assist women whom they do not
view as serious about leaving their abusers. This problem is not unique
to the US. Loretta Kelly (1999) similarly notes that Australian police
sometimes refuse to assist Aboriginal women who make repeat police
calls because they believe the women are uninterested in separating
from their abuser.
Not only does this separation-focus 'devalue women's connections
with their partner[s], (Coker, 2000: 1019), it is based on the false premise that separation equates with safety. In fact, for some women separation increases their risk of death or serious assault (Mahoney, 1991).
Further, the safety that follows separation is largely fictive for poor
women who do not have the resources to relocate. If these women 'have
managed to find low-cost or public housing in the inner city and to
patch together support systems or social services which allow them to
care for their children, they have no alternative but to remain there as
sitting ducks for the abuser when he returns' (Bowman, 1992: 205).5
These are (some of) the harms of mandatory criminal interventions.
However, this is only part of the story. 'The outcome of policing, and of
criminal justice intervention more generally is likely to be varied, perhaps contradictory, and in part determined by context' (Stubbs, 1995:
262). This is true both because women's lives differ from each other in
important respects, and because the implementation and consequences
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of criminal justice intervention policies differ from one location to the
next. 6 These variances are shaped by conditions such as the nature of
support services for battered women, the attitude of local law enforcement officers, the availability of programs for men who batter, the
nature of the relationship between the police force and communities of
colour, and the influence of the local battered women's movement
(Coker, 2000; Pence & McDonnell, 1999). While the crime control
agenda shapes feminist discourse, criminal justice systems are also
shaped by feminist demands that '[r]edefin[e] the purpose of the system
[by] ... attempt[ing] to shift its primary orientation from that of carrying out an abstract standard of justice to one of providing protection
and resources ... [for battered women]' (Sparks, 1997: 36).
Feminists have long been aware of the ambiguous nature of their
efforts to harness the power of the state for the good of battered women
(Schechter, 1982). The results are varied and the impact is shaped by
the different material and cultural positions of women. Women's positions are shaped in part by dominant ideologies that inform the availability and the nature of public resources. Battered women cannot
afford over-privatized remedies that result in their inability to invoke
state power for protection, nor can they afford remedies that give them
no control while presuming to act in the public's best interest.

Three Theoretical Weaknesses of Restorative Justice
Theory for Addressing Domestic Violence
Restorative justice proponents, for the most part, do not recognize this
ambiguous relationship with state power. Categorical statements in
restorative justice literature that presume sharp distinctions between
criminal justice policies that are 'punitive' versus those that are 'restorative' fail to capture this varied reality (Daly, this volume) as does scholarship that depicts a singular victim and offender experience.
Courtrooms may sometimes be 'nightmares' (Martin, 1998) for battered women, but sometimes women feel validated and empowered by
court processes (Ptacek, 1999; Wittner, 1998). Arrest may cause some
abusers to feel shame or rage or both (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994), but
this experience may be moderated by subsequent respectful though firm
treatment from the court (Ptacek, 1999) and treatment programs. Most
men arrested for domestic violence misdemeanours serve little or no
time in jail (Fields, 1994; Karan, 1999; Salzman, 1994) and many in the
US and Canada are ordered to attend batterers' treatment programs
(Dobash & Dobash, 1999a).
It is critical to engage the state on behalf of battered women, but we
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must do so in ways that are sufficiently protective of poor women and
women of colour. Three theoretical weaknesses of restorative justice
theory for use in domestic violence cases hinder its ability to provide this
kind of protection.

Naturalizing state power: restorative justice and a theory of the
state

We need to address the harder and more complex questions about how justice
system practices are saturated and marked by racial-ethnic (and other) divisions, both past and present. (Daly, 2000b: 182)

The first weakness of restorative justice theory for dealing with domestic violence in subordinated communities is the manner in which
restorative justice theorists often construct the state as a distant actor
and thus elide the way state power suffuses all criminal justice processes, including restorative justice processes. I raise this concern not to
argue for the superiority of formal justice processes - indeed, formal
processes are clearly engaged in the same practices - but rather to argue
for the modification of restorative justice processes.
Restorative justice scholars understand crime to be 'primarily ... a
conflict between individuals that results in injuries to victims, communities, and the offenders ... ' (Hudson & Galaway, 1996: 2). In restorative justice processes 'all the parties with a stake in a particular offence
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of
the offence and its implications for the future' (Braithwaite, 1999a: 5
(quotingT. Marshall, 1997, personal communication)). Thus restorative
justice theorists construct the state as a distant or even irrelevant actor
to restorative processes. The result is to elide the operation of state
power that suffuses the processing of criminal cases. The legislature
determines how crimes are defined and state actors within the criminal
justice system determine how these laws are applied, to whom, and
under what circumstances.
As some restorative justice writers have noted, the criminal justice
system may not be the most likely arena for efforts to achieve large
measures of social justice (Braithwaite, 1999a; Daly, 2000b). For example, John Braithwaite (l999a: 105) writes that the most important remedies for controlling crime 'are not reforms to the justice system' but
rather 'reforms about liberty, equality, and community in more deeply
structural and developmental senses'. The difficulty with this response
is that restorative justice processes do more than simply fail to address
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the possible range of social injustices. They legitimate state power
through reinforcing the behavioural norms reflected in the laws and
through naturalizing the justice practices that bring the offender to the
attention of the restorative process.
This legitimizing function illustrates a fundamental tension of
restorative justice processes and the use of John Braithwaite's (1989)
concepts of reintegrative shaming in those processes. (Perhaps, instead,
it illustrates the inevitable tensions in partial reform.) A critical insight
of Braithwaite's work (1989) (and restorative justice work more generally) is that an offender's experience of criminal justice processes may
encourage future offending. Braithwaite (1989: 55) distinguishes
between disintegrative (stigmatizing) shaming and reintegrative shaming. Reintegrative shaming involves 'expressions of community disapproval ... followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community of
law-abiding citizens' (Braithwaite, 1989: 55). Braithwaite argues further
that 'shame is more deterring when administered by persons who continue to be of importance to us; when we become outcasts we can reject
our rejectors and the shame no longer matters to us' (Braithwaite, 1989:
55). In his later work on restorative justice, Braithwaite refers to the use
of 'communities of care' composed of individuals who care about the
offender, to provide reintegrative shaming in restorative processes such
as conferencing (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994: 194).
Thus, reintegrative shaming requires that private individuals agree
with and support the moral norms reflected in the penal laws
(Braithwaite, 1989). It also requires that private individuals (implicitly,
at least) acknowledge the moral authority of the state to create and
enforce those norms. In essence, restorative justice and reintegrative
shaming require an alliance between the state and 'communities of
care'. Given the way in which crime policy is used to control poor people and people of colour, given the racist and classist practices of criminal justice officers, and given the way in which significant numbers of
poor people and people of colour are locked out of electoral politics,
establishing an alliance between the norms of an offender's community
of care and those of the criminal justice system asks a great deal of subordinated communities. Further, unlike some community-police
alliances (Kahan, 1999; Meares, 1997), this alliance does not offer subordinated people much in the way of control of the ongoing operation
of the criminal justice system in their community. As Kathleen Daly
(2000b: 174) argues, restorative justice 'must be tied to a political
process [that includes] a process of engagement among and between the
interests of political minority groups (for example, indigenous and feminist) and governments'. In other words, restorative justice must engage
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with political action directed at state inequalities; it must engage the
state, rather than ignore the state.

Restorative justice theory and the lack of majoritarian opposition
to domestic violence

The struggle to construct the meaning of domestic violence is no less
present in 'communities' than it is in the larger society. The most important questions for thinking about the use of restorative justice processes
in domestic violence cases are 'who defines the problem?' and 'how will
the problem be constructed?' If community is, as Liz Kelly writes, the
result of struggle and conflict over its identity (Kelly, 1996), then
processes that are said to enact community norms cannot help but enter
into that struggle. 'Community' practice cannot be neutral.
John Braithwaite argues that reintegrative shaming, of the kind proposed by some restorative justice advocates, requires that the law in
question 'represent a clearly majoritarian morality' (Braithwaite, 1989:
14), but as Braithwaite and Daly note, '[f]ew societies ... contain a
majoritarian masculinity that sets its face against violence' (Braithwaite
& Daly, 1994: 190). Polls that show significant opposition to domestic
violence are promising (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994; Klein et aI, 1997),
but such research does not capture the degree to which people are sympathetic to the 'the hapless man who must defend against a nagging,
shrewish woman' (Coker, 1992: 110) or the cuckold husband who must
defend his honour (Coker, 1992). Additionally, people often fail to condemn non-violent controlling behaviours such as threats to take children, control of money, isolation of the woman, and extreme jealousy
(Pence & Paymar, 1993).
The question of the norms that will apply is even more complicated
for restorative justice processes like conferencing that rely on family and
supporters. In conferencing, the victim, offender, facilitator, and supporters of both the victim and the offender meet to discuss the crime
and to develop a resolution that focuses on repairing the harm done to
the victim. Thus, with conferencing, the relevant question becomes not
what do most people believe, but rather what do significant people in the
batterer)s (and the victim)s) life believe? Research with men who batter
finds that friends and family often play important roles in supporting
the batterer's view of himself as a victim rather than a victimizer
(Bowker, 1983; DeKeseredy, 1990; Hearn, 1998a, 1998b). Jeff Hearn's
in-depth interviews with abusive men found that their level of violence
was positively correlated with both social isolation (few people with
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whom to talk over problems or socialize) and with having friends who
tacitly or explicitly endorse their violence. Hearn concludes that' [i] t is
likely to be the nature of men's contact with his friends rather than the
volume as such that is most significant [in determining his level of violence]' (Hearn, 1998b: 151, emphasis added).? And what was the nature
of this contact? Hearn found that most male friends either said nothing
or actively supported the man's use of violence (Hearn, 1998b). For
example, a man who stabbed his wife reported the following responses
from his friends:
'What you've done, you've done something wrong, yes. And any man would
have done something more or less similar, maybe not the same thing, or maybe
not even anything related, but they would have fought for their children, sort of
thing'. They said, 'And when children are involved in any sort of relationship or
a man and a woman argument, it's a case of domestic and anything can happen.'
(Hearn, 1998b: 154)

Whether because of familial loyalty, their own experiences with denying
or excusing family violence (Gayford, 1983), or because they fear the
abuser (Pennell & Burford, this volume), family members are also
unlikely to actively oppose the batterer's violence (Hearn, 1998b). One
man's report provides an example:
Q: Did any of your family or any of your friends know about the violence?
A: Two of my brothers knew. You know, they was blaming me for it, but they
know different now. They've read everything what she's put down in statements
and they know now that 99 per cent she started it. (Hearn, 1998b: 152-53)

In addition to micro-environments of family and male friends, the
neighbourhood in which a batterer lives may shape his violence.
Evidence suggests that men who live in the most intensely marginalized
communities are the least likely to be deterred by arrest and criminal
processing and their violence may escalate following arrest (Marciniak,
1994).8
The. responses to offending that develop from restorative justice
processes such as conferencing reflect the understanding of the causes
of the criminal offence shared by those who attend the process. Thus the
result is captured, somewhat, by the limits of the group's understanding.
John Braithwaite's description of drunk driving conferences provides an
example:
I have seen many drunk-driving conferences where the offender is a tottering
alcoholic, but where no one in the community of care raises the need for a drug
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treatment program, sometimes because most supporters are also excessive
drinkers. (Braithwaite, 1999: 69)

While members of the offender's support network may be willing to
express (and even act on) opposition to the offender's driving while
intoxicated, they are unlikely and unwilling to confront the root of his
problem - his alcoholism. Similarly, without a process that deals with
the beliefs and controlling behaviours that accompany domestic violence, conference attendees are likely to focus their attention solely on
stopping the violence. The result is as likely to be encouraging the victim to appease the batterer by complying with his demands, as it is to
support the woman's demands for autonomy.

Theorizing about domestic violence

I recognize that the violence was all about power, about wanting, I had to have
my way, and by any means I would get my way. And usually the quickest means
was violence. At the same time I always used to think that I never got my own
[way] but in effect I did. I always got my own way ... (Hearn, 1998b: 170)

Restorative justice literature concerns itself more with the relationship
of the justice response to further criminal offending than with the nature
of offending, per se (Braithwaite, 1989). This under-theorizing of offending is a significant theoretical weakness for the use of restorative justice
processes in domestic violence cases. 9
Feminist work in domestic violence understands the violence as 'a
way of "doing power'" in a relationship (Mahoney, 1991: 53 quoting
Stets, J, 1988). Feminist criminology suggests that it is also a way of
'doing masculinity' (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994; Newburn & Stanko,
1994). Domestic violence is understood not as an eruption that follows
'conflict', but rather as part of a system of controlling behaviour. This is
why reform systems require that battering men enrol in batterers' treatment programs that address a range of controlling behaviours that make
up a battering system (Adams, 1988; Edleson & Tolman, 1992; Pence &
Paymar, 1993). An emphasis on conflict resolution hides the struggle for
control and the feelings of male entitlement that often create the context for 'conflict' (Dobash & Dobash, 1998; Fischer, Vidmar & Ellis,
1993).
Men who batter frequently describe themselves as victims (Coker,
1992). They equate women's verbal aggression or threats to separate
with a physical assault requiring a physical response (Coker, 1992). A
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batterer's belief in his status as a victim is often tied to gendered conceptions of appropriate behaviour for his female partner. Her failure to
prioritize his needs, her failure to make herself available sexually, or her
failure to control the children are felt as attacks on masculinity and provide a rationale for violence (Dobash & Dobash, 1998). As described in
the previous section, these beliefs find much support both within the
larger culture (Mahoney, 1991) and within the micro-cultures in which
the batterer operates (Bowker, 1983).
Lee Bowker argues that interventions with men who batter must be
'multidimensional' in order to address the multiple systems roots of
masculine violence (Bowker, 1998). Those who urge an ecological
approach to understanding battering make a similar argument (Dutton,
1995; Edleson & Tolman, 1992). This requires understanding the interactive links to battering that occur at the social, cultural, personality,
biological, and economic system level (Bowker, 1998).
Part of this systems approach is to recognize the ways in which men
construct masculinity and the relevance of that construction to violence
directed at women. As Angela Harris writes, when men use violence or
threaten violence it may be 'an affirmative way of proving individual or
collective masculinity, or in desperation when they perceive their
masculine self-identity to be under attack' (Harris, 2000: 781). Understanding the manner in which masculinities are shaped by race, class
and ethnic identities and experiences may be central to successful intervention against battering. More privileged men are often better
equipped to make their partner appear at fault (Waits, 1998). For
example, when women leave, these men have the means to carry out
protracted litigation that drains the woman's financial resources (Waits,
1998) .
As Harris notes, men who are denied access to dominant forms of
idealized masculinity because of hierarchies of race, class, or sexual orientation may create oppositional definitions of masculinity that are
nonetheless shaped by the dominant model. For example, '[b] uilding on
and subverting racist stereotypes, working-class and poor black men
may aspire to a masculinity that emphasizes physical strength, mental
control, and sexual prowess' (Harris, 2000: 784). Others may develop a
form of 'hypermasculinity' which rests on 'exaggerated exhibition[s] of
physical strength and personal aggression' (Harris, 2000: 785).
Battering is not only the product of the operation of systems in the
batterer's life (Edleson & Tolman, 1992), it is also shaped by structural
inequalities in the lives of women (Schneider, 1992). One of the key
such structural supports for battering is the lack of material resources
available for women (Coker, 2000). Some abusive men select women
because they are economically vulnerable (Jacobson & Gottman, 1998).
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Even were this not the case, battering men often ensure that women
become and remain economically vulnerable (Raphael, 1995, 1996;
Zorza, 1991). Access to adequate housing, employment, childcare, and
health care are important determinants of women's victimization.
Research by Cris Sullivan finds, for example, that when advocates assist
battered women with access to material resources and community services, women experience less re-abuse than do women who do not
receive the same assistance (Sullivan & Bybee, 1999).

Transformative Justice

Restorative justice processes do not generally address these sources of
battered women's inequality nor do they address the subordinating systems that may operate in the life of the batterer. The concept of restoration suggests that a prior state existed in which the victim experienced
significant liberty and the offender was integrated into a community; in
many cases neither is true (Morris, 1995). Rather than restorative justice, battered women should have the option to choose processes that
operate with a transformative justice ideal.
Some writers use the term transformative justice interchangeably
with the term restorative justice (LaPrairie, 1995b; Porter, 1999), but
Ruth Morris argues for distinguishing between the two concepts
(Morris, 1994, 1995). Morris seeks to incorporate into justice processes the recognition that 'socioeconomic wrongs [are] at the root of our
existing definitions of crime and punishment' (Morris, 1994: 290). She
argues that while it is superior to more punitive models, restorative
justice 'ignores structural causes of crime' (Morris, 1995: 72), which she
understands to be 'an attempt to find power by the powerless and a negative response to pain by those in pain' (Morris, 1994: 291). She argues
that when a crime is committed it presents an opportunity for the community to address its inequalities (Morris, 1995; see also LaPrairie,
1995a). Additionally, Morris adds the criminal justice system as a fourth
player to restorative justice's focus on offender, victim, and community
(Morris, 1995).
Morris's concept of trans formative justice suggests possibilities for
enhancing the capacity of restorative justice processes to intervene in
domestic violence cases. Her vision of justice recognizes the criminal
justice system as an actor and thus offers an alternative to the manner
in which restorative justice theory and practice elide state power and
naturalize criminal justice processes. Morris also recognizes the importance of identifying and addressing the links between the offender's
experiences of subordination and his offending.
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Despite these advantages, Morris's theory presents problems for
application in domestic violence cases. Morris's single attention to
structural explanations for crime results in what Jack Katz (1988: 313)
refers to as 'sentimental materialism'. This structuralist approach fails to
recognize the importance of how people construct the experience of
offending (Harris, 1997). If applied to domestic violence cases, Morris's
theory fails to address the importance ofthe gendered way in which batterers understand, explain, and experience their violence. Men who
batter operate within constructs of masculinity that reinforce male dominance of women. Their explanations for their violence centre on
women's perceived failures to live up to expectations for appropriate
women's behaviour. Their violence is often directed at reinforcing male
privilege and control of women's sexuality. Morris's structuralist
approach also fails to acknowledge the role of offender choice and moral
decision-making. As Angela Harris notes, 'crime does not simply
emerge from structures of oppression and injustice; crime is committed
by people who consciously make choices about their actions and how
they wish their actions to be interpreted' (Harris, 1997: 42). This failure
to attach clear moral blame may reinforce batterers' tendencies to blame
the victim or others for their violence.
In addition, Morris fails to address the duality of oppression: the powerless in one context are the powerful in another context (Harris, 1990).
The result is an incomplete structural account of crime. In reality, not
only does inequality create crime, but crime (victimization) creates and
maintains inequality. Domestic violence creates and deepens female
poverty (Browne, 1995), it limits women's participation in civic and
economic life (Zorza, 1994), and it debases and devalues women's lives
in ways that deeply affect their emotional and spiritual sense of themselves (West, 1999).
An expansion of Morris's concept of transformative justice that is
informed by feminist/critical race feminist theory would address both
aspects of the relationship of battering to social inequality: the manner
in which subordinating experiences in the lives of batterers relate to
their decisions to batter and the manner in which their battering subordinates women.
This concept of transformative justice builds on research that demonstrates that batterers' networks are important supporters of battering
behaviour as well as on restorative justice theory that emphasizes the
ability of supporters to care for victims and reinforce non-offending
norms in offenders. It differs from and expands upon restorative justice
processes in several ways. First, rather than rely on existing community
norms, it takes as its aim the transformation and creation of communities that support women's autonomy. 10 Second, it considers
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reintegration of the batterer important but secondary to enhancing the
victim's autonomy. 11 Third, it offers an opportunity to recognize the
manner in which systems of oppression in the batterer's life - 'including
economic policies that result in an inability to support families, racist
structures, substance abuse and addiction, and histories of horrific
childhood abuse' (Coker, 1999: 50-51) - relate to, but do not excuse,
his use of violence. A transformative practice challenges not only the
state's monopoly on responses to crime, but also challenges racial and
gender subordinating institutions, beliefs, and practices that support the
crime of battering.

Examples of transformative processes

Current programs that work in subordinated communlties provide
models for a transformative justice process. These programs do not
reject the use of coercive state power, but rely more prominently on
changes in batterer networks, provision of support for battered women,
and processes that link gender ideology and subordination with experiences of racial subordination and colonization. These programs aspire to
meet the transformative goals of redefining gender expectations and
norms and building more just communities to support these changes.
The Institute for Family Services in Somerset, New Jersey provides
one such example (Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999). The Institute
works with Asian Indian-American families. Some abusive men are
court-ordered to the program while others are voluntary participants.
The program is based on the concept that 'it is essential to dismantle the
power dynamics connected to gender in a way that does not simultaneously obscure and thereby collaborate with related systems of institutional oppression, such as racism and heterosexism' (Almeida &
Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999: 657). Each client of the program is given a
sponsor of the same sex whose job it is to 'connect the client to the collective experience of his or her gender, racial, and cultural group'
(Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999: 669). Through discussions of clips
from movies such as Sleeping with the Enemy and Straight Out of
Brooklyn, men in all-male 'culture groups' are encouraged to think about
how differences of race and class affect the choices of the battered
women in the films. The groups also encourage men to relate their own
experiences of racism and classism to the issues of gender subordination. For example, 'one Muslim, dark-skinned Asian Indian father of
three, who was referred for battering his partner and 12-year-old son,
offered comprehensive ... analyses of racism ... He was challenged by
his male peers ... to use his analysis of race to better understand their
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requests for him to treat his female partner and his son nonviolently'
(Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999: 678).
Couples sessions occur if the victim requests them and after the perpetrator accepts full responsibility for his abusive behaviour. These
meetings are attended by sponsors and therapists. In one such meeting
a man who had abused his wife and daughter read a letter in which he
accepted responsibility for his violence. The effect was to produce in the
wife and daughter' [feelings of] empowerment and dignity, as men and
women they had never met unequivocally held the abuser accountable
for his violence in a public forum' (Almeida & Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999:
679). The meeting was subsequently described to the man's culture
group where ' [he] was supported by his peers for taking the first steps
toward establishing justice in his marriage' (Almeida & DolanDelvecchio, 1999: 679). The entire process became what John Braithwaite refers to as a 'reintegrative ceremony' (Braithwaite, 1989: 102). It
provided the batterer with the opportunity to make amends and
acknowledge his responsibility for causing great harm to his family,
while also reinforcing the wife and daughter's sense of dignity and moral
worth. The process was also transformative because it reinforced the
emerging egalitarian norms of the men's culture group and in turn the
process in the group linked the struggle for gender equality with the
struggle for racial and economic justice. For women, the Institute provides support without requiring that women choose between cultural
identity or group membership and their safety and autonomy (Almeida
& Dolan-Delvecchio, 1999).
Other programs for heterosexual men of colour who batter similarly
focus on relating the experiences of racial/ethnic subordination to the
men's own use of power to subordinate their female partners (Carrillo
& Goubaud-Reyna, 1998; Duran & Duran, 1995; Duran et aI, 1998;
Tello, 1998; Williams, 1998). All stress that the man's own experiences
of oppression do not excuse or justify his own oppressive behaviour. All
seek to enable men to redefine their masculinity in ways that do not
depend on oppressing women. These programs vary in the degree to
which they rely on defining masculinity in a manner that is overtly
oppositional to that of Anglo-European conceptions of masculinity.
In Navajo peacemaking, a process similar to conferencing, some
peacemakers use similar strategies in dealing with domestic violence
cases. These peacemakers employ traditional Navajo stories that contain
gender egalitarian themes (Bonvillain, 1989; Zion & Zion, 1993) to
enlist the language of cultural and political sovereignty to create conceptions of masculine identity that support gender egalitarianism
(Coker, 1999). Peacemakers use these stories to instruct parties regarding their gendered responsibilities to each other, including the
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husband's responsibility to treat his wife with respect (Coker, 1999;
Zion & Zion, 1993).
It is tempting to think of these processes as 'treatment' and therefore
not 'law', but they are justice-making processes. These processes focus
on education and organizing, not the individual psychology of the batterer or the battered woman. They rest on the realization that community is a project of political will and imagination (Harris, 1997; Kelly,
1996). Further, while processes such as those of the Institute do not
directly alter the ways in which racial and class subordination shape
crime legislation or criminal justice processing, they may form the basis
for political action to attack those inequalities. Even if this were not true,
they enable women in those communities to live less coerced lives.
We can also learn from justice programs that are not specifically
focused on domestic violence. For example, Angela Harris's description
of the work ofthe Prisoners' Alliance with Community (PAC), an informal organization operating out of Green Haven Prison in New York
State (Harris, 1997), provides another example of transformative justice. The program operates with an Afrocentric and Latinocentric
approach and 'places current statistics about the disproportion of
African-American and Latino people in prison in the historical context
of white supremacy ... ' (Harris, 1997: 43). The PAC approach 'stresses
"empowerment" rather than "rehabilitation": transformation of the
offender and the community rather than a simple adjustment of the
offender to the community' (Harris, 1997: 44). Harris quotes PAC
material:
Inherent in the theory of rehabilitation is the concept that it seeks to 'correct'
the individual such that it returns him or her to a state or condition that he/she
was in, or should have been in, prior to the objectionable behavior ... [But] [t]he
conditions for Blacks and Latinos prior to the objectionable behavior was one
of a disadvantaged, second class citizen, in relationship to full and unobstructed access to the benefits, rewards and power in society. This lack of access clearly was a factor which contributed to the objectionable behavior. (Harris, 1997:
44)

PAC is not only interested in coming to understand the racial subordination that relates to choosing criminal behaviour, it is also interested
in reconciliation with the community. This requires that prisoners
acknowledge the wrongs they have committed. '[It] begin[s] with an
apology and proceed[s] into five stages: recognition, responsibility,
reconstruction, reconciliation, and redemption' (Harris, 1997: 44-45).
Harris does not note whether PAC specifically addresses crimes of
violence against women, but the PAC approach of linking offender
responsibility to the community while at the same time recognizing the
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injustices in the offender's life suggests the possibility for transformative
processes that go beyond a 'program' and into the neighbourhood.

Principles of transformative justice process

A transformative justice project offers an alternative to the separationfocused interventions of the dominant forms of justice intervention. It
helps women build a community that supports women's autonomy
without forcing women to choose between their ethnic/racial communities and safety (Coker, 2000; Presser & Gaarder, 2000). Transformative
justice processes must avoid the trap of 'privatizing' violence, but violence is not privatized when a man reads an apology to his wife and
daughter in the presence of others, particularly when those others are in
a position to monitor his future behaviour. In this way, transformative
justice processes capture the benefit available in formal adjudication:
that of a public repudiation of the batterer's behaviour and a declaration
of unilateral responsibility for his violence (Fenton, 1999; Schneider,
1991) . Needless to say, facilitators in a transformative process should
not aspire to a neutral ideal (Umbreit & Zehr, 1996) but, like Navajo
peacemakers (Coker, 1999) should make transparent the normative
assumptions from which they operate (Freshman, 1997). These normative assumptions should not only oppose violence, but should support
women's autonomy.
Contrary to some descriptions of conferencing (Retzinger & Scheff,
1996), a transformative process for domestic violence cases should not
focus on eliciting forgiveness from the victim. The benefits of 'reintegration' for the batterer (Braithwaite, 1989) are found in enabling him
to understand both his responsibility for his use of violence and controlling behaviour and his behaviour's 'continuity with the violence of
racial, economic, and colonizing hierarchies. Reintegration does not
require that the victim forgive him and certainly does not require that
they reconcile, though it does not foreclose the possibility. Pressure to
forgive places the victim in an untenable position of once again subordinating her own needs to those of the abuser.
Further, while public apologies from the abuser are important, there
is a danger in placing too much emphasis on an apology. Some abusive
men are quick to apologize, but slow to change (Coker, 1999). In order
to guard against this kind of 'cheap justice' (Coker, 1999), a transformative justice process should include extensive fact-finding, planning,
and enforcement. The kind of fact-finding that I have in mind is similar
to the process of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Hearings
(Minow, 1998), to interracial justice described by Eric Yamamoto
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(Yamamoto, 1999)12 and to the practices of some Navajo peacemakers
(Coker, 1999; Yazzie & Zion, 1996). This fact-finding should ideally
include the abuser's family and supporters, and at some point, the family and supporters of the battered woman. As the work of batterers'
treatment programs illustrates, this takes time.
The focus in restorative justice literature on symbolic reparations is
misplaced where the material resources available to the victim are
directly responsible for her ongoing vulnerability to the batterer's control. Transformative justice should address the material needs of the
victim whether through unencumbered access to crime victim compensation programs (Mills, 1999) or through direct transfers of money or
services from the abuser or his family to the victim (Braithwaite & Daly,
1994; Zion & Zion, 1993).

Conclusion

Feminist critics are correct to worry that restorative justice processes
may privatize domestic violence, creating a second rate justice that
offers little protection for battered women. Indeed, current restorative
justice processes seem largely inadequate to the task of addressing
domestic violence. There are few restorative justice models that address
the manner in which community opposition to domestic violence may
be weak or non-existent. In addition, restorative justice literature offers
little in the way of theory for understanding male violence against
known women.
Restorative justice processes frequently involve a second kind of privatization, as well. Rhetoric that highlights the power of individuals to
address crime may serve to make invisible the manner in which state
power is deployed to define crime and to enforce criminal laws.
Subordinated communities are poorly served if a discussion of social
inequalities and discriminatory criminal justice practices are 'off-limits'
for the restorative justice process.
Thus restorative justice processes may fail battered women because
the particular dynamics of battering are poorly understood or because
the process results in tacit approval of some measure of 'acceptable'
male control of female partners. Restorative justice processes may fail
both men and women in subordinated communities because of the failure to address their social context.
On the other hand, current anti-domestic violence strategies that
focus on crime control measures create real dangers for women, and this
is particularly true for women who are most vulnerable to state intrusion and control. Thus, women in subordinated communities must be
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concerned with both the coercive power of the state as well as the
coercive power of battering men (Coker, 2001). The question is how to
control the state - to ensure adequate protection for battered women without creating increased state control of women.
Because '[w]omen live under conditions of unequal personal and
systemic power that affect all aspects of our lives ... ' (Mahoney, 1994;
60), we cannot presume that a singular response to domestic violence
will be effective for all women. Rather, as Gordon Bazemore (this volume) writes, we need a 'menu of responses' to domestic violence that
account for the structural inequalities of women's lives.
The transformative justice model sketched here is an attempt to further expand our 'menu'. This model addresses the structural inequalities that frame the battering experience for men and women in
subordinated communities, provides material and social support for
battered women, and holds men who batter responsible for their violence. Adoption of a transformative process does not mean that domestic violence should be decriminalized. Women must be assured that
when police are called they will come, and that arrest takes place when
women request arrest and the circumstances are legally sufficient for an
arrest. But battered women risk not only that the police will fail to protect them, but that opening the door to state intervention will create
additional sites for state control.
Battered women require transformation: transformation of their families, communities, and the state. Transformative justice processes can
link with formal justice processes (Braithwaite & Daly, 1994; Presser &
Gaarder, 2000) and create programs that centre on this transformation.

Notes
1

2

3

An additional privatizing concern not often mentioned by feminist critics
relates to the private role of restorative justice facilitators and participants.
Facilitators are private actors in ways that are not true of judges. They are
not subject to removal under the same conditions, their decisions are less
likely to be subjected to public scrutiny, and to the extent that their ranks
are more numerous and their membership less well defined, they may be
more insulated from reform measures such as domestic violence education.
The focus of state child protection agencies on the children of poor women
of colour should be understood as part of a long history of US policies
aimed at controlling the reproduction of poor women, particularly AfricanAmerican women (Roberts, 1997).
These policies are also intended to 'shift the burden of confronting the
abuser from the shoulders of the victim' to that of the state (Gamache &
Asmus, 1999: 76; Hanna, 1996) and to 'hold the batterer accountable'.
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However, 'holding accountable' may have different meanings. As Claire
Renzetti writes, 'Could another translation of [holding batterers accountable be] ... "failing to adequately punish men for their violence?'" (Renzetti,
1998). Similarly, Laureen Snider suggests that feminist support for criminalizing policies confuses penality with social control (Snider, 1998).
4 Kathryn Abrams describes 'agency' as the partial autonomy women enjoy
under systems of oppression. (Abrams, 1999). Martha Mahoney similarly
notes that '[a]ll work with subordinated people confronts ... the challenge of
analyzing structures of oppression while including an account of the resistance, struggles, and achievements of the oppressed' (Mahoney, 1994: 59).
5 Many battered women desire to separate from their abuser and these
women need assistance and protection from the state. This assistance
should address the desperate need many women have for additional material resources (Coker, 2000).
6 Activists with the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, a model program
that is often credited with the implementation of mandatory arrest and nodrop prosecution policies in the US and elsewhere, note that without a system-wide response that includes services and supports for victims,
mandatory criminal policies can fail and even harm women (Pence &
McDonnell, 1999).
7 Hearn provides a more detailed analysis of his study in his book, The
Violences of Men: How Men Talk About and How Agencies Respond to Men's
Violence to "WOmen (1998a).
8 Tracey Meares makes a similar point describing the relationship between
social disorganization and criminal behaviour in a neighbourhood (Meares,
1997).
9 An additional weakness of restorative justice processes and hence much of
the theory that flows from those processes is that the majority of practice
and research has focussed on juvenile offenders who commit property
crimes. The leap from this context to work with adult offenders who
commit violent crimes recommends caution in applying current research
conclusions to domestic violence cases.
10 Carol LaPrairie (1995a) similarly notes that processes may be transform ative because they have 'the potential for transforming communities by
responding more realistically and effectively to community inequalities,
needs, and conflicts'.
11 Presser and Gaarder similarly argue for restorative justice processes that
make '[v]ictim well-being and safety ... the first priorities' (Presser &
Gaarder, 2000: 186).
12 While Yamamoto describes a process in which communities of colour on
both sides of a conflict engage in extensive fact-finding, soul-searching,
apology and reparations, my focus is on the batterer's response (Yamamoto,
1999). Yamamoto describes 'the four "R's'" necessary for interracial justice:
recognition (what I refer to as fact-finding), which includes investigating
'stock stories' that groups use to legitimate grievances against the other
group; responsibility, which requires that the group 'assess carefully the
dynamics of group agency for imposing disabling constraints on others';
reconstruction, which 'entails active steps ... toward healing the ... wounds
resulting from disabling group constraints'; and reparation, which 'seeks to
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repair the damage to the material conditions' and create 'material changes
in the structure of the relationship (social, economic, political) .. .'
(Yamamoto, 1999: 10-11). He refers to reparations without changes in
material conditions as 'cheap reconciliation'. I adopt Yamamoto's assessment and label as 'cheap justice' processes that over-value offender apologies without accompanying material changes (Coker, 1999: 85)~

